QF would be a great addition to the NNS and fix many of its issues caused by liquid democracy and its inherent unfairness. But I doubt it’d work without a battle tested proof of personhood system.
1 Like
Agreed with all your points.
I’m afraid this proposal might add unneeded complexity and the risk of more centralization on top of an already shaky system.
1 Like
It seems to me this proposal is designed to take away the freedoms that past big tech projects where built on, investors money, that could invest on these projects but had no say, that was left up to the few that have great potential but this proposal wants to give a bunch of committees the ability to stifle inspiration who are motivated to have control just so they can control who gets rewards.
I have had enough of the few neuron owners on the forum that are trying to massage the future of the NNS around themselves and would like to hear from those who continue to vote down their proposals.
We need to get the SNS and CF right so that the IC benefits first and then we are all rewarded by its success.
I propose we are allowed to invest our neuron on projects that I personally feel I want to invest on because I see potential and let those inspirational project builders build.
I am not inspired by this proposal
1 Like
What’s the status on implementing this? Are you reliant on the DF to code it up? If we can incentivize voting on governance topics without incentivizing spam that is one necessary but not sufficient ingredient towards promoting decentralization.
I assume that this is waiting on the SNS to ship like a number of other governance things. Someone else could get started on this, but they’d need to be a hell of a rust dev and really understand the NNS inside and out.
Why pure liquid democracy better than representative democracy:
-
Representative democracy is proven fail us in reality governance world.
-
Representative’s objectiveness is easy to be steered and redirected to align with the lobbyist agenda.
-
The decision power will only tap several mind of so-called ‘popular’ experts / representatives who might have better skill in politic, lobbying & mass communication instead of their core competencies.
Pure liquid democracy looks chaotic, unorganized and inefficient, but it represents the true spirit of decentralization & people’s voice / power.
With current pure liquid democracy on ICP, actually we can achieve same/better result without changing to representative democracy.
Idea to improve current liquid democracy:
To encourage many experts to create their neurons and start to contribute to ICP governance, the followers should share some % of their neuron maturity with their expert neuron.
If they are too lazy to vote by themself and it is fair if they share some of their maturity yield with the neuron owner’s they follow.
This is also to encourage people to participate and vote actively on their own if they do not want to share their % maturity.
2 Likes
i think followee already does that represent Ness of voting, with right voting power distribution. your c neuron doesn’t mention about where those voting power profits go.
we all know that democracy is slow and painful process, while dictatorship is fastest way to govern. Steve Jobs biography says it, but Steve Jobs is hard to come by. picking followee is better solution on this topic, since we can change it anytime we want.
Hi all,
thanks for the lively discussion and the many interesting ideas (in the original post and all the answers).
As is evident from this discussion, there are a few things that we might want to improve in governance. Also, there are already many different ideas how to achieve some of these improvements (e.g., including internal discussions as mentioned here).
As already announced by @bjoernek in a different thread, we think that it would be good to set up a governance working group. It sounds like many of the things discussed here would be perfect for discussing in this group!
We are looking into how and when to set this up, likely this will happen after we wrapped up the SNS MVP work.
One feedback to the main post (some of this has already been mentioned by others): it might be beneficial for the discussion here, as well as for the working group, to make very explicit…
- What are the core problems that a proposal tries to solve? Why are these problems?
- Can the design / problem statement be broken down into different components? (E.g., here the concept of roadmap proposals seems to be new. Is this something that would also be relevant independently of committee neurons?)
- How is this design different (pros and cons) from the current implementation and from alternative options?
- Can the proposal be evaluated against the governance goals defined here or does it propose new goals that should be added (that is, does it suggest that we change what we mean by “good governance”)?
5 Likes
I want to respond to those pointing out the problem statements I started with. I apologize, I do feel like I didn’t spend much time accurately coming up with the exact problems that exist and why this would solve those. I contemplated leaving the problem statements out and just offering up this design for consideration, as I generally feel this design to have characteristics required to make liquid democracy actually work. Deeper analysis is warranted, I’m just glad we are discussing various solutions to the problems, whatever those are, that exist.
3 Likes
Wow, this is an amazing thread! Thanks and kudos to @lastmjs for kicking it off!
I must admit am not really on-board with c-neurons (since I am not convinced of their advantage over building similar structures with the more liquid following mechanism) or the roadmap committee (which I think would amplify some problems we have with the governance topic today). On the flip side, I fully agree that replica upgrades are likely the most important type of proposal that need more decentralization – but they’re also the hardest one, since it takes significant effort to just stay current with all the changes happening in the weekly releases, let alone reviewing them for security.
What I think may be helpful is picking one particular topic that we want to improve decentralization on (as I said replica would be great, but it’s also very hard), and then we iterate on how we’d see a good scenario for that work out, and think about governance improvements from there? That will probably allow us to focus on fundamental discussion first (e.g., should some people be rewarded for putting significant effort into validating proposals; how can their work be evaluated; who decides what they get; where is that paid from) and then we can look into the best technical solutions? A good candidate could also be upgrades of governance canisters, which are a lot more manageable since the respective code base is a lot smaller.
8 Likes
Sounds like a good idea to me.
3 Likes
Finally someone is willing to work hard for it
2 Likes
I wonder if a good first step is the ability to decentralize the control of a single neuron. Right now, AFAIK, neurons can only be controlled by one key pair. So the 9-member neuron that DFINITY owns and is used to control updates to the replica code, really only has one key pair that can unilaterally push changes. This is according to my understanding. You’ve written about this here: How to create a decentralized community neuron
1 Like
Regarding point #1: Representative democracy can succeed and work well unless the structure hosting it is already corrupt itself. Just because something fails sometimes, that doesn’t mean all aspects or iterations of it are inherently flawed. By contrast, no one has ever been able to run something more complex than MakerDAO (which essentially only needs to set interest rates) using current Web3 DAO structures. We simply do not have a way to run a large complex organization (a company like Samsung for example) with direct vote public poles or the standard web3 DAO structures.
Regarding point #2: Crowd objectiveness is also easily steered by digital ads, the media, and famous people. Mobs can be just as stupid and corrupt as individuals, if not more so.
Regarding point #3: Exactly, which is why I think new accountability mechanisms which can automatically remove bad representatives at the protocol level will be crucial! (see my other comment here: Committee Neurons - #63 by aiv) However, at least individuals can have competency, any competencies within a crowd tends to get drowned out by noise. Mobs are not good at making decisions on very complex topics which require experience, knowledge, and skill. A mob will also make decisions blindly on the provided options without any motivation or ability to create new options or compose alternate solutions. This still leaves most of the power with those who decide which options to present for public vote. For example, the whole brexit thing was extremely messy. Also, would you trust a public vote on a highly technical task like the development of an update to the specifications of Ethernet cables?
4 Likes
The main DFINITY beacon neuron is actually controlled in the way I outlined in that forum post you linked – there is no single key pair controlling it. For all voting topics, it follows a group of other neurons which are controlled by individual key pairs.
4 Likes
I wish I could like this post more than once.
1 Like
we only need to allow the motion proposal to have the right to fork, and ensure that the whole process of the motion proposal (creation, on-chain discussion, voting, and results) is not controlled by any centralized organization.
Of course, the premise is to delete the mandatory voting and the oligarch list so that the motion proposal has the correct voting result
What about its controllers?