There’s been a lot of discussion on Spam Proposals already - so I think it’s safe to assume we’re all aware of the issue. (If you aren’t up to date, here is the original “proposal” that spurred this one forward. Wenzel does a great job highlighting the history & issues with spam proposals.)
With that being said, I personally don’t believe that indefinitely scaling the price to participate in governance is the way to go. Simultaneously, I didn’t want to come up empty handed, while saying “this doesn’t work”, so I’d like to propose an (potentially controversial) alternative to the 100ICP reject cost.
A Permanent Solution to NNS’ Spam Proposals
Create a new proposal type “Identifying Spam Proposals”
Create a 24 hour grace period for proposals, in which maturity is not distributed.
Create a functionality within the NNS to only distribute maturity for a proposal under the conditions;
i) an “Identifying Spam Proposal” was not submit for the proposal in question within the grace period.
ii) The “Identifying Spam Proposal” submit during the grace period was rejected, signifying it is in fact not a spam proposal.
In the instance an “Identifying Spam Proposal” is accepted (signifying it is in fact spam), the Proposal is ignored during the Maturity Distribution period.
The idea behind this is that in the instance there is a spam proposal, there is a 24 hour grace period in which maturity is not dispersed, allowing participants of the NNS to identify the proposal, and submit an “Identifying Spam Proposal”. Upon the submission of the “Identifying Spam Proposal”, maturity is further withheld until a consensus is reached. If NNS Participants come to an agreement, that a proposal is in-fact spam - the corresponding maturity would be burnt. Alternatively, if a proposal is found to be incorrectly reported via “Identifying Spam Proposals” , and is voted to not be spam, the corresponding maturity is disbursed to its neurons.
EDIT: Thinking back, I think it’d also be beneficial to implement a strike system. If a neuron submits x proposals that are identified as “Spam Proposals”, it loses its ability to submit proposals. This would address “repeat offenders”, as the original idea only addresses the rewards aspect. I’d also like to add that @MillionMiles idea to implement a viewing threshold, of say 5% of voting power, would simultaneously address the NNS UI Spam, while this addresses rewards.
I believe this is a potential solution, but it will require some fine tuning to get correct. Additionally, it would require a fair bit of dev work to be done - which we can’t expect DFINITY to handle all the time. If you’re interested in developing this idea further, please feel free to give some feedback on this forum, or reach out to me via twitter @accumulating.icp